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LAWRENCE V. TEXAS,
123 S. CT. 2472 (2003)
FACTS
Two officers of the Harris County, Texas police department
responded to a reported weapons disturbance at the residence of John
Lawrence.' The officers entered the residence and saw Lawrence engaged in
a sexual act with another man, Tyrone Gardner.2 The officers arrested
Lawrence and Gardner and detained them overnight.3  The two men were
charged and convicted before a justice of the peace for violating Texas's
anti-sodomy law.4 They did not question the right of the police to enter the
residence.5 Subsequently, Lawrence and Gardner requested a new trial in the
Harris County Criminal Court, asserting that the statute violated both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a similar
provision of the Texas Constitution.6 The court rejected Lawrence and
Gardner's arguments and fined them both after they entered a plea of nolo
contendere.
Lawrence and Gardner appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals."
The court held the Texas statute constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 9 Relying on the
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,'0 the court upheld the convictions." The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
convictions of Lawrence and Gardner violated either the Equal Protection
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether
the Court should overrule Bowers v. Hardwick.1
2
1 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
2 Id. at 2475-76.
Id. at 2476.
4 Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
5 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
6 Id. at 2476; see also TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a.
7 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003).
I ld.
Id.
10 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers, the police arrested two men for
violating a Georgia statute that prohibited sodomy, regardless of the participants' gender. Id. at 199.
Hardwick contested the constitutionality of the statute in federal court, claiming that as a practicing
homosexual the statute forbade him from engaging in constitutionally protected acts. Id. The Supreme
Court did not recognize the Constitution as protecting Hardwick's right to engage in sodomy and upheld
the statute. Id.
11 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
12 Id.
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HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District and ruled the Texas statute
unconstitutional. t3 The Court held that the Due Process Clause granted
Lawrence and Gardener the right to engage in private sexual intimacy
without interference from the government. 14  The Court also overturned
Bowers.'s
ANALYSIS
The Court framed the issue as whether the petitioners were free to
engage in private sexual intimacy in the exercise of their liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court began by
examining the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in
Griswold v. Connecticut.17 In Griswold, the Court recognized the right to
privacy as a protected interest based on the marital relationship, which
guarded the privacy of the marital bedroom.' The Court next analyzed
Eisenstadt v. Baird,'9 which extended that right to privacy to unmarried
persons by using the Equal Protection Clause.20  The Eisenstadt Court had
stated that "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."2' After Eisenstadt, the Court examined
Roe v. Wade,22 which expanded the protection of the Due Process Clause to
protect a woman's right to an abortion as an exercise of her liberty. 23 The
Court noted that the three cases extended the reasoning of Griswold beyond
13 Id. at 2484.
14 Id.
is Id.
16 Id. at 2476.
17 Id. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court ruled that a state law, which
criminalized the use or assistance in the use of contraceptives, violated a constitutional right of privacy.
Id. at 485. Griswold was based on the traditional values associated with marriage; therefore, the holding
did not transfer a right of privacy to personal sexual privacy or non-marital relationships. Ad.
Is Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
19 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court held that a law that
restricted the distribution of contraceptives to only married persons was unconstitutional. Id. at 454. The
Court decided the case under the Equal Protection Clause, explaining that the law restricted the personal
rights of unmarried persons. Id.
20 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454).
21 Id. (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held that a Texas law banning abortions
was unconstitutional. Id. at 166. The Court emphasized that the protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause helped to define and protect the rights of the person. Id. at 153.
23 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
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protecting only the rights of married adults and that the Due Process Clause
has a substantive element that protects the fundamental rights of a person.24
The Court next examined Bowers, which resembled the case of
petitioners, with one notable exception: the Georgia statute in Bowers
applied equally to both opposite-sex and same-sex sodomy, whereas the
Texas statute applied to only same-sex sodomy.25 The Court employed a
three-prong attack against the Bowers decision. It began by acknowledging
that the Bowers Court erred in framing the issue.26 The Bowers Court had
originally framed the issue as a question of whether homosexuals enjoyed a
constitutionally protected fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 27 The
Court stated that framing the issue in this way minimized the liberty at
stake .28 Both the purpose behind the statute and the penalty imposed for
violating it demonstrated that the consequence of the statute was far more
damaging than simply not allowing homosexuals to engage in a specific
sexual act.29 The statute regulated "the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. 30  The Court
recognized that the Constitution grants persons the right to engage in
homosexual conduct, in expression of their sexuality, in their own private
lives and homes, and neither the government nor the courts have the right to
control this expression by defining or setting the limits of relationships.3'
The Court then accused the Bowers Court of overstating and
simplifying the historical background of sodomy.32 Although the Bowers
Court had claimed that "proscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,
33
the Court stated that there is no extensive legislative history directed solely at
homosexual conduct.34 The Court further stated that early American law
attempted to prohibit any sexual conduct that was not for the purpose of
procreation. 35 Although there were laws that criminalized sodomy among
same-sex and opposite-sex couples,36 the laws were generally not enforced
when the act occurred in private between consenting adults.37  Most
nineteenth century prosecutions of sodomy involved children, force, persons
24 Id. See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a New York
statute that forbade the sale or distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age).
25 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
26 Id.





32 Id. at 2480.
33 Id. at 2478 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
3 Id.
35 Id. at 2479.
36 Id. at 2478.
37 Id. at 2479.
2004]
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of disparate status, or animals.38 It was not until the 1970s that a small
number of states began to target homosexual acts for criminal prosecution.39
After establishing that the historical reliance by the Bowers Court
was unfounded, the Court attacked the moral foundation of the Bowers
decision.40  The Bowers Court relied on the longstanding moral
condemnation of homosexual sodomy, created by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family.4' In response to this condemnation, the Court referred to the more
recent laws and traditions of European countries and the United States, which
support the view that liberty provides substantial protection to adult persons
in their private sexual choices. 42 The Court was not convinced that religious
beliefs or moral traditions allowed a state to force its moral views upon
society through its criminal statutes.43
Subsequent to dismissing the historical and moral foundations of
Bowers, the Court analyzed two additional cases decided after Bowers that
further weakened the decision.44  The Court first discussed Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,45 which confirmed the
protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause. 6 The Casey Court stated
that the Due Process Clause protected personal decisions of marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.47 In explaining the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause
for these matters, the Casey Court stated,
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they





42 Id. at 2480-81.
43 Id. at 2480.
" Id. at 2481.
45 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
47 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
48 Id. (citing Casey 505 U.S. at 851).
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The Court stated that although persons in homosexual relationships should
enjoy the same liberty as heterosexual persons for these purposes, Bowers
had denied this fundamental right to persons engaged in homosexual
relationships.49
After acknowledging that the constitutional protections confirmed in
Casey extended to homosexuals, the Court considered Romer v. Evans, °
which held that the Equal Protection Clause protected the rights of
homosexuals.5' Petitioners had asserted that the Texas statute was
unconstitutional under the same reasoning as Romer, but the Court reached
for a broader ground of decision because Romer would allow states to
prohibit both same-sex and opposite-sex sodomy, thereby effectively
continuing to criminalize private sexual intimacy between homosexuals.
5 2
By overruling Bowers, the Court eliminated this possibility.53 The Court
sought to invalidate Bowers because "its continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons. 54 The Court rejected the application of the
Equal Protection Clause because deciding the case on substantive due
process grounds would advance equal protection interests as well.55 The
Court explained that a stigma remains when a law that criminalizes protected
conduct is overruled on equal protection grounds and not on substantive due
process grounds.56
The Court then decided that the doctrine of stare decisis did not
prevent the overruling of Bowers.57 The Court reiterated its statement in
Casey that when the Court is contemplating the invalidation of a holding
based on a constitutional liberty interest, it should consider the individual or
societal reliance on the liberty interest. 58 The Court decided that overruling
Bowers would not destroy any individual or societal reliance. The Court
further stated that Bowers itself prevented reliance because prior and
49 Id. at 2482.
50 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, Colorado amended its constitution to deprive
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, who expressed their sexuality either by orientation, conduct,
practices, or relationships, of protection under the state's antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 624. The Court
deemed the amendment unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 634. The
amendment was "born of animosity toward the class of persons affected" without the purpose of any
legitimate state interest. Id.





56 Id. This stigma might result from state registration laws for sexual offenders, employment
applications that require an applicant's legal history, and the criminal conviction itself. See id.
57 Id.
s9 Id. at 2483.
59 Id.
2004]
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subsequent cases contradicted its central holding.60 Thus, stare decisis,
historical traditions, and moral foundations did not prohibit the Court from
overruling Bowers.6' Moreover, the fundamental liberty basis of substantive
due process encouraged such action.62
Having overruled Bowers, the Court reversed the judgment of the
Texas Court of Appeals. 63 Because of the right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause, the Court stated that the petitioners had a constitutional right
to engage in private sexual intimacy without intrusion by the government.
64
The Court further asserted that Texas had no legitimate state interest that
would justify intrusion into the petitioners' personal lives.65
CONCURRING OPINION
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court to strike
down Texas's statute as unconstitutional, but refused to join the Court in
overruling Bowers.66 According to Justice O'Connor, the issue of whether a
sodomy law that criminalized both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy
violated substantive due process was not in dispute.67 Rather, she based her
conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause. 8
Justice O'Connor first cited Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,69 which stated that the Equal Protection Clause mandated that all
similarly situated persons be treated equally.70 She stated that the Court will
uphold statutes that treat similarly situated persons differently if there is a
rational connection between the disparate treatment and a legitimate state
interest.7' In the petitioners' case, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Texas statute did not treat all similar persons equally because it prohibited
homosexual sodomy but allowed heterosexual sodomy. Because she was
unable to determine a legitimate state interest that would justify the Texas
law, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Texas law violated the Equal
Protection Clause and concurred in the Court's judgment.72
60 Id.
61 Id.





67 Id. at 2487.
68 Id.
69 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
70 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
71 Id. (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). See also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123
S. Ct. 2156 (2003); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).




Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined, dissented from the judgment of the Court.73 Justice Scalia
criticized the majority's manipulation of stare decisis. 74 Justice Scalia stated
that the majority decision allowed the Court to overrule an earlier opinion if
"its foundations have been 'eroded' by subsequent decisions, it has been
subject to 'substantial and continuing' criticism, and it has not induced
'individual or societal reliance' that counsels against overturning. '"75 He
analyzed both Bowers and Roe under the majority's conditions and
concluded that the Court could have overruled both opinions; because the
Court did not overrule both, he opined that the majority applied stare decisis
in a manipulative, inconsistent way.76
Justice Scalia then stated that the Due Process Clause does not create
a right to liberty." Instead, the Due Process Clause explicitly allows a state
to deprive its citizens of liberty when due process of law is provided. 78
Justice Scalia further stated that although the doctrine of substantive due
process prohibited states from infringing upon fundamental liberty interests
without a compelling state interest, the scope of fundamental liberties was
narrow.79 These fundamental rights had to be substantially grounded in the
nation's history and tradition.80 Justice Scalia stressed that the right of
homosexuals to engage in homosexual sodomy was not grounded in the
nation's history or tradition; instead, the nation's history and tradition
opposed the recognition of such fundamental rights.8"
According to Justice Scalia, the majority overruled the Texas statute
solely on the basis that Texas had no rational basis for its law against
homosexual sodomy.8 2 Justice Scalia stated that the statute advanced the
belief of the citizens that some forms of sexual behavior are immoral and
unacceptable. 3 Justice Scalia believed that Texas had a legitimate state
interest in protecting moral values and that the Court, by disallowing moral
bases as legitimate state interests, had de-legitimized criminal laws against






77 Id. at 2491.
78 Id.79 Id.
so Id. at 2492.
,, Id. at 2492-95.
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Justice Scalia also dismissed Justice O'Connor's equal protection
argument.8 5 Facially, the Texas law applied equally to all persons because
the law penalized every person that had deviate sexual intercourse with a
member of the same sex, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation. 6
Although the law attached a penalty to same-sex partners, Justice Scalia
believed that the Court could not rule the law unconstitutional because states
use the same basis to prohibit same-sex marriage. 7 Justice Scalia further
argued that rational basis review and not heightened scrutiny, was the
appropriate test to apply to the law.8 Thus, Justice Scalia refused to concur
in the majority's opinion because he believed that the statute was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest of advancing moral values and that it did
not deny any persons equal protection under the laws or encroach upon a
constitutionally protected fundamental right. 89
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent in which he noted that the
Texas law was "uncommonly silly."90 He stated that he would vote to repeal
the law if he were a member of the Texas legislature, but he acknowledged
that, as a Justice of the Court, he did not possess such power.91 Because he
could find no constitutionally granted right of privacy or fundamental right
that would deem the law unconstitutional, he dissented.
92
CONCLUSION
Society will realize the full impact of Lawrence over time as it
responds to the expansion of rights for individuals involved in same-sex
relationships. Although Lawrence mandates that state-enacted anti-sodomy
laws criminalizing private consensual sodomy are unconstitutional, the
implications for the military's anti-sodomy law, the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, and the prohibition on same-sex marriages are not as
clear. Politics will undoubtedly play a major role in the development of the
rights extended by Lawrence.
In deciding the constitutionality of the Texas statute, the Supreme
Court expanded the rights of same-sex couples who engage in private sexual
intimacy by employing substantive due process instead of the Equal





s9 Id. at 2498.
90 Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2482.
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Equal Protection Clause as advanced in Justice O'Connor's concurrence,94
states would have retained the ability to discriminate against homosexual
activity by engaging in selective and discriminatory applications of opposite-
sex sodomy laws. Lawrence prevents such targeted actions against persons
involved in same-sex relations by deeming both same-sex and opposite-sex
sodomy laws unconstitutional. 9
Although the Supreme Court struck down the Texas law and twelve
additional state laws as unconstitutional, the Court only explicitly invalidated
the Texas law.9 6 This could present a future problem as states try to get
around the Lawrence ruling. Because Lawrence only invalidates laws that
criminalize private sexual intimacy, state legislatures could become more
creative in their distinctions between public and private action. For example,
the Commonwealth of Virginia maintains that Lawrence does not govern its
sodomy statute to the extent that it applies to public acts, even though there is
no express public provision in the law.97
In addition to invalidating state laws, Lawrence may also serve to
overrule current military law that prohibits both same-sex and opposite-sex
sodomy. 98 The current military law is being challenged in a case involving
an airman who engaged in same-sex sodomy with a fellow airman.99 The
only distinguishing characteristic between this case and Lawrence is the
airman's military status. Through substantive due process, Lawrence
protects one's liberty to engage in private same-sex sodomy, 1'0 and its ruling
should cover every member of the military because those who serve and
protect our country deserve full constitutional protection. Although the
military will argue that repealing the sodomy law will negatively impact unit
cohesion and effectiveness, a noted military sociologist and eight other social
scientists and military experts filed an amicus brief disputing this claim.'0 '
The sentiment against same-sex sodomy is strong in the military, as
evidenced by the discriminatory "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, but the
amicus brief in conjunction with Lawrence could give the military court the
94 Id. at 2484-88.
9s Id.
96 See LAMBDA LEGAL, GET THE FACTS ABOUT SODOMY LAWS (2003), at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1231 (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
The Court's ruling affects the laws of Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Virginia, and Utah. Id.
97 Matt Chittum, Sodomy Law Ruling Sparks VA. Debate; Groups Question Validity of VA. Law,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 18,2003, at Al.
98 LAMBDA LEGAL, LAMBDA LEGAL, ACLU AND SLDN URGE MILITARY'S HIGHEST COURT TO
STRIKE DOWN LAW BANNING CONSENSUAL SODOMY (2003), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/recordrecord=l 328 (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
99 Id.
100 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
1o LAMBDA LEGAL, supra note 98. Noted military sociologist Charles Moskos filed the brief in
support of repealing the sodomy law.
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impetus to strike down the sodomy law. 0 2 Because the anti-sodomy law is
the basis of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 103 striking down the anti-
sodomy law would also undermine the basis for the military's discrimination.
Even though Lawrence dictates that all state anti-sodomy laws
prohibiting private sodomy are unconstitutional and has cast serious doubt
upon the military's practices and policies, the opinion does not offer as much
support to same-sex marriages. At first glance, the opinion does seem to
bolster the argument in favor of same-sex marriages. The Court employed
the language of Casey, stating that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence."' 4 The Court opined that this right
extended to persons engaged in same-sex relationships.'15 Marriage is the
ultimate form of defining one's existence and after marriage, society treats
persons differently by rewarding them with increased benefits and
responsibilities. Although it appears that liberty would allow same-sex
couples to define their own existence through marriage, the majority
explicitly stated that Lawrence offers no opinion on government recognition
of same-sex relationships. 10
6
Justice Scalia further weakened the possibility of legalizing same-
sex marriage by using his dissent to rally the politically moderate population.
In his dissenting opinion, he announced that the majority's opinion left state
laws against same-sex marriage open to attack and then grouped same-sex
marriage with "traditional 'morals' offenses" such as adult incest and
obscenity. 10 7 In doing so, Justice Scalia implicitly encouraged the passage of
the currently proposed amendment that would limit marriage to heterosexual
couples.
Although Lawrence does not legalize same-sex marriage, the Court's
willingness to consider the international sentiment regarding same-sex
relationships is promising. In Lawrence, the Court refuted moral and
historical arguments in favor of anti-sodomy laws by citing varying
international laws that recognize the rights of homosexuals to engage in
sexual conduct.0' The Court's acknowledgement of international law may
assist proponents of same-sex marriage in future litigation because many of
102 If the military does not strike down the anti-sodomy laws, an appeal will likely be made to the
Supreme Court. Then the issue will also involve the Court's traditional deference to the Military.
SERVICE MEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK, SUPREME COURT SODOMY DECISION IMPLICATES
FEDERAL SODOMY STATUTE & "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" (2003), at
http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/ecord.html?record=992 (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
103 Id.
104 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
IDS Id. at 2483.
"06 Id. at 2484.
107 Id.
"08 Id. at 2483.
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our international neighbors already recognize civil unions or same-sex
marriages. 0 9
As the Supreme Court and other government entities apply Lawrence
to different situations, the implications of the opinion will become apparent.
At the very least, Lawrence overrules all state laws that criminalize private
acts of sexual intimacy. With moderate application, the case guarantees
rights in the military and offers the support for same-sex marriage if society
allows it.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Patricia A. Jones
109 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN CIVIL MARRIAGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/gbt/civil-
marriage.pda (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
2004)

